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ALL EYES ON US: A COMPARATIVE
CRITIQUE OF THE NORTH CAROLINA
INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION
JEROME M. MAIATICO
INTRODUCTION
For over eighteen years, Darryl Hunt sat in his prison cell
1
searching for ways to tell the world he was an innocent man. He was
convicted for the 1984 rape and murder of a woman in WinstonSalem, North Carolina.2 Over the next two decades, he filed eleven
3
motions in four different courts, but to no avail. The criminal justice
system condemned the wrong man, and then made it nearly
impossible for that man to be heard. Eventually, thanks in large part
to the press that kept digging up exculpatory information and drawing
attention to his case, DNA testing identified the right man.4 That man
confessed, and Darryl was cleared. In 2004, a judge vacated the
murder conviction, and Darryl was pardoned by Governor Mike
Easley.5 Stories like this shake the very foundation of the criminal
justice system and can cause the public to lose faith in the system of
6
laws. North Carolina has had many of these stories.
Although wrongful convictions are not unique to North Carolina,
the state’s response to this growing problem has been very unique. In
fact, North Carolina has taken the lead and established a model for
addressing wrongful convictions. On August 3, 2006, Governor

Copyright © 2007 by Jerome M. Maiatico.
1. Phoebe Zerwick & David Rice, Governor Pardons Hunt: 20-year Ordeal Ends for Man
Wrongly Convicted, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 16, 2004, at A1.
2. Id.
3. Christine Mumma, Editorial, An Escape Route from Prison for the Innocent, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Aug. 30, 2005, at 9A.
4. Zerwick & Rice, supra note 1.
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 18–31 and accompanying text.
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7
Easley signed House Bill 1323 into law, making North Carolina the
first and only state in the United States to establish an innocence
inquiry commission—an independent review commission set up to
8
investigate prisoner’s claims of innocence. Former Chief Justice I.
Beverly Lake Jr. of the Supreme Court of North Carolina greeted this
commission by saying, “I think it will be a significant step forward for
the criminal justice system in North Carolina and across the
nation . . . . I think other states may follow.”9 North Carolina’s
innocence inquiry commission could indeed become a model for how
states, and even the federal government, should handle wrongful
convictions, but only if it is successful. All eyes will be on North
Carolina.10
To evaluate the likelihood that the North Carolina innocence
inquiry commission will be successful, this Note examines the United
Kingdom review commission after which it was patterned.11 The
United Kingdom review commission has achieved moderate success
in correcting mistakes made by its own criminal justice system.12 From
a comparative perspective, the North Carolina innocence inquiry
commission should be able to match that success if it can avoid
budget and resource pitfalls, and operate in a manner that improves
judicial economy. Just as the appellate process in the United
Kingdom was not designed to handle miscarriages of justice,13 the
prior avenues for postconviction relief in the North Carolina judicial
system were not equipped to address claims of innocence. The North
Carolina innocence inquiry commission ameliorates that problem by

7. H.R. 1323, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006).
8. Kytja Weir, N.C. to Look at Innocence Claims: State is 1st in Nation to Create an
Independent Review of Possible Wrongful Convictions, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, Aug. 4, 2006,
at B1.
9. Henry Weinstein, N.C. to Weigh Claims of Innocence, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at
A18.
10. Stephen Saloom, the policy director for the Innocence Project at the Cardozo School of
Law, said the “whole nation will be watching” what happens in North Carolina. Weir, supra
note 8.
11. The United Kingdom’s Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) was enacted by
Parliament under the Criminal Appeal Act of 1995. Christine Mumma, The North Carolina
Actual Innocence Commission: Uncommon Perspectives Joined By a Common Cause, 52
DRAKE L. REV. 647, 654 (2004). The CCRC is an independent body responsible for
investigating miscarriages of justice in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Id.
12. See infra notes 177–180 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 127–129 and accompanying text.
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providing an effective forum for prisoners like Darryl Hunt where
new evidence strongly supports their innocence claims.
This Note is divided into four sections and provides background
and analysis of “innocence commission” issues in North Carolina.
Part I discusses the need for change in the North Carolina criminal
justice system and advocates the idea of an innocence commission.
Part II provides background on the new North Carolina Innocence
Inquiry Commission (NCIIC) and details the process through which
the NCIIC will review factual innocence claims. Part III provides
background on the United Kingdom’s Criminal Cases Review
Commission (CCRC) and details its process for reviewing miscarriage
of justice claims. Part IV analyzes the differences between the North
Carolina and United Kingdom commissions and predicts the success
of the NCIIC. The Note concludes by describing how the innocence
inquiry commission in North Carolina may provide the foundation for
reform of the postconviction relief available in the federal and state
criminal justice systems.
I. THE NEED FOR AN INNOCENCE
COMMISSION IN NORTH CAROLINA
The criminal justice system fails society when an innocent person
is convicted and the actual criminal remains free. As with any system
operated by humans, though, the criminal justice system is imperfect
and makes mistakes. Unfortunately, for many years there was no real
way to gauge the accuracy of the system or pinpoint specific cases
where the system made mistakes.14 This changed with the advent of
DNA technology and its application in forensic investigations in the
1980s.15 In 1989, an Illinois inmate became the first innocent man to
be exonerated by DNA technology, marking “the beginning of a
16
revolution in the American criminal justice system.” Since 1989, a
body of specific cases—both related and unrelated to DNA
evidence—has developed in which it is evident that the criminal
justice system convicted the wrong person. Between 1989 and 2003,

14. See Keith Findley, Learning From Our Mistakes: Criminal Justice Commission to Study
Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 334 (2002) (stating that without a valid measure
“it is so very hard to know which outcomes are accurate and which are not”).
15. Id.
16. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523 (2005) (“Since 1989, these once-rare events [exonerations of
falsely convicted defendants] have become disturbingly commonplace.”).
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340 individuals in the United States were exonerated from crimes for
which they had been previously convicted, including 144 individuals
17
cleared by DNA technology. North Carolina has been significantly
affected by this “revolution.” In addition to Darryl Hunt, many highprofile cases of exonerations have emerged in the state over the past
decade:
• Ronald Cotton from Burlington, North Carolina served
eleven years in prison after being convicted of two 1984
18
rapes. In 1995, DNA tests proved that Cotton was innocent
of the crimes.19
• Lesly Jean was arrested in Jacksonville, North Carolina in
20
1982 and convicted of rape and sexual assault. Jean served
nine years in prison before his conviction was overturned
21
because police had failed to disclose important evidence.
In 2001, DNA tests proved that the criminal justice system
had convicted the wrong man.22
• Terence Garner served nearly four years in prison for the
1997 armed robbery of a finance company and shooting of a
23
secretary in Johnston County, North Carolina. After
Garner’s trial, three alibi witnesses emerged and another

17. Id. at 524. Gross describes his study as follows:
The exonerations we have studied occurred in four ways: (1) In forty-two cases
governors (or other appropriate executive officers) issued pardons based on evidence
of the defendants’ innocence. (2) In 263 cases criminal charges were dismissed by
courts after new evidence of innocence emerged, such as DNA. (3) In thirty-one cases
the defendants were acquitted at a retrial on the basis of evidence that they had no
role in the crimes for which they were originally convicted. (4) In four cases, states
posthumously acknowledged the innocence of defendants who has already died in
prison . . . .
This is the most comprehensive compilations of exonerations available, but it is not
exhaustive.
Id. at 524–25 (citations omitted).
18. Phoebe Zerwick, Closed Doors: Case Review Finds that a Series of Troubling Decisions
Cast a Dark Shadow of Doubt over a Divisive Case, WINSTON-SALEM J., Nov. 23, 2003, at A1.
19. Id. Cotton’s case involved the misidentification of Cotton by one of the victims. Id.
20. Rebecca J. Britton, The Lesly Jean Story: A Quest for Truth, A Quest for Justice, TRIAL
BRIEFS, Jan. 2002, at 38, 38, available at http://www.ncmoratorium.org/site/documents/Britton
Jan02.pdf; The Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Lesly Jean, http://www.innocenceproject.org
/Content/183.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
21. The Innocence Project, supra note 20. “[Jean’s] conviction was based, in part, on
prosecutorial error and erroneous eyewitness testimony.” Id.
22. Id.
23. Jane Ruffin & Adrienne Lu, Retrial Ruled Out for Garner: For Prosecutor, SBI Report
Raises Doubts, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), June 12, 2002, at 1A.
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24
man confessed to the crime. The PBS documentary series
“Frontline” aired Garner’s story in January 2002, and one
month later Garner was released from prison.25 The district
26
attorney dismissed all charges against Garner in June 2002.
• Leo Waters served twenty-one years in prison after being
convicted in the 1981 rape and sexual assault of a woman in
27
Jacksonville, North Carolina. Waters was cleared of the
crime by a DNA test in 2003, and all charges against him
28
were dismissed.
• Alan Gell served nearly nine years in prison, including four
years on death row, for the 1995 murder of a North Carolina
29
man. Gell was granted a new trial shortly after the local
newspaper ran a series outlining problems with the first
30
trial, including prosecutorial misconduct. In 2004, Gell was
31
acquitted of the murder.
Given these cases, it is evident that innocent persons are
sometimes convicted in North Carolina while the real criminals
remain at large. These cases are representative of widespread
problems that plague the criminal justice system, such as
misidentifications, “false confessions, lab errors, prosecutorial
misconduct, false witness testimony, poor legal representation, and
32
Studies have consistently
‘investigative tunnel vision.’”
demonstrated that Americans have less confidence in the criminal
justice system than in other institutions,33 which likely results in part

24. Id.
25. Id. Garner’s attorney, Mark Montgomery, credits the PBS documentary series with
providing the impetus for his client’s release: “It’s humbling to realize I spent four years trying
to get this kid, who I believe to be innocent, out of prison using all my lawyer skills, and a 90minute television documentary springs him like magic.” Id.
26. Id.
27. Associated Press, Massachusetts Inmate is Charged in ‘81 Rape, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Aug. 18, 2005, at 4B; The Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Leo Waters, http://
www.innocenceproject.org/Content/284.php (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
28. The Innocence Project, supra note 27.
29. Joseph Neff, Gell Found Not Guilty, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Feb. 19,
2004, at 1A.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Mumma, supra note 3.
33. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 112 (2003) (providing statistics in Table 2.10, “Reported Confidence in
Selected Institutions,” that show Americans have less confidence in the criminal justice system
than in institutions such as banking, the medical system, public school, and television news).
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from such documented, high-profile mistakes. The issue is not
whether the North Carolina criminal justice system makes mistakes,
because it clearly does. Instead, the issue has become how the system
can be improved to limit and correct these mistakes, so that the
government may rebuild public confidence in the system.
Currently, the North Carolina criminal justice system provides
little or no redress for innocent prisoners with factual innocence
34
claims. The criminal justice system generally provides a right to
direct and collateral review; however, the scope of this review is
limited to fixing legal and procedural errors, not reassessing guilt or
innocence.35 A convicted prisoner with a factual innocence claim can
pursue three avenues for relief: 1) a post-trial Motion for Appropriate
Relief based upon newly discovered evidence, 2) federal relief based
upon the writ of habeas corpus, or 3) executive clemency from the
Governor. Each of these avenues has significant flaws that make it
ineffective. First, the remedial scope of the Motion for Appropriate
Relief is substantially restricted by State v. Britt.36 Second, the
37
and the
Supreme Court’s decision in Herrera v. Collins
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)38
severely limit the scope of habeas relief in federal courts.39 Finally,
executive clemency, a prisoner’s last resort, is often considered an
40
arbitrary process affected by wholly political factors.
In North Carolina, all post-trial motions relating to the trial,
including factual innocence claims based on newly discovered
evidence, must be brought under a Motion for Appropriate Relief

34. Gary D. Robertson, N.C. Senate Panel Eyes “Innocence Commission,” STAR-NEWS
(Wilmington, N.C.), Apr. 14, 2005, http://search.starnewsonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?
AID=/20050415/NEWS/50414021&SearchID=73272979646223 (last visited Feb. 21, 2007)
(paraphrasing Dick Taylor, member of the N.C. Actual Innocence Commission and Executive
Director of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers); Interview with James Coleman,
Professor, Duke Univ. School of Law, in Durham, N.C. (Dec. 8, 2005).
35. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 404–05 (1993) (holding that factual
innocence is not a freestanding basis upon which a federal court generally may grant habeas
relief).
36. See State v. Britt, 360 S.E.2d 660, 664 (N.C. 1987) (applying a seven-factor test
narrowly, making it difficult for defendants to get a new trial).
37. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
38. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Relief Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261–2266 (2000).
39. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404–05.
40. See Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power
from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 608–10 (1991) (arguing that political pressures cause
executive clemency to be an ineffective remedy for wronged prisoners).
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41
(MAR). An MAR, which is generally reviewed by the trial judge,
allows a defendant to contest the trial court’s decision even after all
direct appeals have been exhausted.42 A defendant is allowed to file
an MAR within a “reasonable time” after new evidence is
43
discovered. However, under the North Carolina statute and Britt,
there is a strict standard for evaluating an MAR on the grounds of
44
newly discovered evidence, and relief is rarely granted. The Britt
court explained that to meet this standard, the defendant must prove
each of the following elements:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

That the witness or witnesses will give newly discovered
evidence.
That such newly discovered evidence is probably true.
That it is competent, material and relevant.
That due diligence was used and proper means were
employed to procure the testimony at trial.
That the newly discovered evidence is not merely cumulative.
That it does not tend only to contradict a former witness or to
impeach or discredit him.
That it is of such a nature as to show that on another trial a
different result will probably be reached and that the right will
45
prevail.

Factual innocence claims under an MAR also suffer from
46
procedural and judge-related limitations. For example, MARs based

41. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1411(c) (2005 & Supp. 2006).
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1415(a) (2005). Unless the defendant files an MAR within ten
days after entry of judgment, however, this form of relief is available only when the defendant
appeals on one of several enumerated grounds. See id. § 15A-1415(b) (enumerating “the only
grounds which the defendant may assert by a motion for appropriate relief made more than 10
days after entry of judgment”).
43. Id. § 15A-1415(c).
44. See State v. Britt, 360 S.E.2d 660, 664 (N.C. 1987) (restricting the remedial scope of
section 15A-1415(c)). According to statute, the defendant has the heavy burden of establishing
that the newly discovered evidence was “unknown or unavailable to the defendant at the time
of trial . . . could not with due diligence have been discovered or made available at that time . . .
and . . . has a direct and material bearing upon . . . the defendant’s guilt or innocence.” § 15A1415(c).
45. Britt, 360 S.E.2d at 664 (quoting State v. Cronin, 262 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1980)).
46. Eli Paul Mazur, “I’m Innocent”: Addressing Freestanding Claims of Innocence in State
and Federal Courts, 25 N.C. CENT. L.J. 197, 204–16 (2003). Mazur contends that the MAR in
North Carolina is subject to three pervasive limitations: (1) “[t]he [d]ue [d]iligence [p]roblem,”
in which “North Carolina courts consistently deny MAR . . . because the evidence was available
at trial, [thus] punish[ing] factually innocent and wrongfully incarcerated inmates because of the
lack of resources or the ineptitude of trial counsel,” id. at 205–06; (2) “the [s]tatutory
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upon newly discovered evidence are often denied for failure to meet
47
the due diligence standard. This standard prevents the submission of
evidence if it was available at the time of trial but simply not
discovered by defense lawyers, possibly due to lack of time or
funding.48 Relief also will not be granted on an MAR if the newly
discovered evidence is “merely cumulative,” meaning that judges will
not consider new, stronger exculpatory evidence that is related to
evidence already admitted at trial.49
Moreover, the judge who presided over the trial generally
50
entertains the MAR and must determine “that on another trial a
different result will probably be reached.”51 One study of MAR
proceedings uncovered “a tension between the trial judge’s
investment in the original trial result and the petitioner’s protected
interest in presenting newly discovered evidence of actual
52
innocence.” In Darryl Hunt’s case, it took eleven motions over an
eighteen-year period to overcome the procedural and judge-related
limitations imposed by North Carolina law.53
Federal courts also provide prisoners with little redress for
factual innocence claims. Under federal habeas corpus law, prisoners
must overcome a high burden for relief to be granted based on newly
discovered evidence.54 In addition, federal law makes it difficult for

[p]reference for the [t]rial [j]udge to entertain the MAR,” in which the trial judge is more likely
to cast doubt on new evidence that would change the trial result and is “subject to direct
electoral pressure [and thus] less likely to find error . . . in state post-conviction proceedings,” id.
at 207; and (3) “[r]ecanted [t]estimony of [c]odefendants,” in which “North Carolina courts
consistently dispose of MAR based upon the recantation or repudiation of codefendant
testimony by holding that the recantation is ‘exceedingly unreliable,’” id. at 214.
47. Id. at 205.
48. Id. at 204–05.
49. Britt, 360 S.E.2d at 664.
50. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1413(a)–(c) (2005). This statute has a strong built-in preference
for the trial judge:
The judge who presided at the trial is empowered to act upon a motion for
appropriate relief. . . . When a motion for appropriate relief may be made before a
judge who did not hear the case, he may, if it is practicable to do so, refer all or a part
of the matter for decision to the judge who heard the case.
Id. § 15A-1413(b)–(c).
51. Britt, 360 S.E.2d at 664.
52. Mazur, supra note 46, at 214.
53. Mumma, supra note 3; see also supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text.
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33. A motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence must
be made within three years of final judgment and will be granted only “if required in the interest
of justice.” Id.
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55
claims of factual innocence to be heard by federal courts, and
prisoners face a strict one-year statute of limitations on most federal
habeas petitions.56 The AEDPA further restricts innocent prisoners
57
by requiring greater deference to state courts, some of which offer
very limited avenues for postconviction relief, like in North
Carolina.58 For example, one provision of the AEDPA limits the
power of federal courts to grant relief unless the state court’s
handling of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law . . . [or] was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court.”59
The Supreme Court has seldom ruled on the availability of
60
federal habeas relief for factual innocence claims. In Kuhlmann v.
Wilson,61 the Court held the door open to freestanding factual
innocence claims, stating “[e]ven where . . . the many judges who have
reviewed the prisoner’s claims . . . have determined that his trial was
free from constitutional error, a prisoner retains a powerful and
legitimate interest in obtaining his release from custody if he is

55. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2000) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it
appears that . . . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State.”);
id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii) (forbidding federal courts from holding evidentiary hearings on claims
for which an applicant failed to develop the factual basis in state court proceedings, unless that
factual basis “could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due
diligence”).
56. Id. § 2244(d)(1).
57. Id. § 2254(d)(1).
58. See supra notes 41–53 and accompanying text.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
60. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2086–87 (2006) (“[The] question [is] whether
federal courts may entertain convincing [freestanding] claims of actual innocence . . . . We
decline to resolve this issue.”); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 328 (1995) (distinguishing the
freestanding factual innocence claim in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), from Schlup’s
gateway innocence claim); Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398–99 (see infra text accompanying notes 64–
68); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (“[A] federal court may hear the merits of the
successive claims [through the ‘actual innocence’ exception] if the failure to hear the claims
would constitute a ‘miscarriage of justice.’”); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452–53 (1986)
(see infra text accompanying notes 61–63); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963) (“[T]he
existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not a
ground or relief on federal habeas corpus.”). This Note provides only a brief overview of federal
habeas relief jurisprudence. Because this Note focuses on innocence commissions, the
remainder of the discussion of federal relief in this Part concentrates on the finality principle in
Kuhlmann and the ultimate issue of whether habeas relief can be granted on a freestanding
factual innocence claim in Herrera.
61. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
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62
innocent of the charge for which he was incarcerated.” It noted,
however, that a prisoner’s strong interest in access to a forum to test
the fundamental correctness of his conviction must be carefully
balanced against the state’s interest in the finality of its criminal
justice proceedings.63
Subsequently, in Herrera, the Court said that factual innocence is
not a freestanding basis upon which a federal court may generally
64
grant habeas relief. It concluded that factual innocence claims based
solely upon newly discovered evidence do not raise a constitutional
65
issue, with the possible narrow exception of those involving a “truly
persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’” in capital cases.66 The
Court further reasoned that determinations of guilt or innocence are
reserved for the state courts, and that trial evidence should not be
reconsidered in federal courts.67 It viewed executive clemency as the
“fail safe” that allows the criminal justice system to correct wrongful
68
convictions. Since Herrera, no federal habeas relief has been granted
to any prisoner based on a freestanding factual innocence claim.69

62. Id. at 452.
63. Id. at 452–53. The Supreme Court stated:
[T]he deterrent force of penal laws is diminished to the extent that persons
contemplating criminal activity believe there is a possibility that they will escape
punishment through repetitive collateral attacks. Similarly, finality serves the State’s
goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes because “[r]ehabilitation demands
that the convicted defendant realize that ‘he is justly subject to sanction, that he
stands in need of rehabilitation.’” Finality also serves the State’s legitimate punitive
interests. When a prisoner is freed on a successive petition, often many years after his
crime, the State may be unable successfully to retry him. This result is unacceptable if
the State must forgo conviction of a guilty defendant through the “erosion of
memory” and “dispersion of witnesses” that occur with the passage of time that
invariably attends collateral attack.
Id. (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 127–28 & n.32 (1982)) (citations omitted).
64. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400.
65. Id. at 404 (“Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence [do not]
state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring
in the underlying state criminal proceeding.”).
66. Id. at 417.
67. See id. at 401 (“Federal courts are not forums in which to relitigate state trials.”
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983))).
68. See id. at 415 (“Executive clemency has provided the ‘fail safe’ in our criminal justice
system. . . . [H]istory is replete with examples of wrongfully convicted persons [and] [c]lemency
provided the relief mechanism . . . .”).
69. Lissa Griffin, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspective, 16
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1241, 1305 (2001); see, e.g., House v. Bell, 126 S. Ct. 2064, 2087 (2006)
(stating that “the threshold for any hypothetical freestanding innocence claim [is]
‘extraordinarily high’” and “that House’s showing falls short of the threshold”).
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The executive clemency provision of the North Carolina
Constitution vests the governor with the power to “grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, after conviction, for all offenses . . . upon
70
such conditions as he may think proper.” However, executive
clemency is often considered an arbitrary process, and the governor’s
decision may be affected by wholly political factors.71 As one
commentator suggests, “The most important factor in successful
clemency applications appears to be the widespread support of
influential individuals in the community.”72 Clemency requests are
rarely granted, and when they are, it is generally only after the
73
prisoner has been released from the criminal justice system. The
governor also has complete and unfettered authority to reject
requests. For example, Governor Easley once refused to recuse
himself from a clemency decision regarding a case he prosecuted as
district attorney—a seemingly obvious example of a conflict of
interest.74 For these reasons, clemency is often not viewed as a
practical alternative for prisoners with factual innocence claims.75
Why have North Carolina courts and federal courts chosen to
make it so difficult for prisoners to obtain postconviction review? The
answer may lie in what the Supreme Court calls the principle of
finality. In Kuhlmann, the Court stated that the “[u]nlimited
availability of federal collateral attack burdens our criminal justice
system as successive petitions divert the time of judges, prosecutors,

70. N.C. CONST. art. III, § 5, cl. 6.
71. See Kobil, supra note 40, at 608–10 (arguing that political pressures cause executive
clemency to be an ineffective remedy for wronged prisoners).
72. Id. at 610.
73. Governor Easley is currently considering about 250 clemency requests. He has taken
action on four requests since he took office in 2001, granting clemency to Lesly Jean and Darryl
Hunt (with DNA evidence to exonerate them) and commuting two death penalty sentences to
life in prison. Power To Pardon in N.C. Ends with Governor, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Mar. 20, 2005, at 14A. Prior to Governor Easley’s administration, only three North
Carolina death row inmates in nearly a quarter of a century had had their sentences commuted
to life in prison by the governor. Death Penalty Information Center, Clemency News and
Developments: 2002-2001, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=2056 (last visited
Mar. 31, 2007).
74. Associated Press, Convicted N.C. Man Won’t Be Pardoned, USATODAY.COM, Aug. 18,
2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-08-18-nopardonnc_x.htm (last visited Mar. 3,
2007).
75. See, e.g., Arleen Anderson, Responding to the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims
After Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 514–15 (1998) (contending that executive
clemency is not a meaningful alternative for those with actual innocence claims because of the
lack of procedural safeguards and considerable discretion given to one individual).
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76
and lawyers from the important task of trying criminal cases.” The
finality principle stands for the practical reality that courts do not
want to be flooded with petitions from prisoners claiming they are
innocent, especially given that those prisoners’ guilt has already been
adjudicated. This same principle also applies at the state level, as
commentators suggest that the current MAR law was written to
“control the volume of claims” in the North Carolina criminal justice
system.77 The court system was not designed to provide
comprehensive review of factual innocence claims and is not
equipped to handle an influx of such claims. An independent review
commission relieves the burden placed on the criminal justice system
by providing an important screening mechanism for the courts.

II. THE NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY COMMISSION
In response to highly publicized wrongful convictions in North
Carolina, such as those of Terence Garner and Ronald Cotton, Chief
Justice I. Beverly Lake Jr. created a task force called the North
Carolina Actual Innocence Commission (NCAIC) in November
2002.78 The NCAIC was established to address wrongful conviction
issues and to improve “North Carolina’s justice system and [its]
79
citizen’s [sic] faith in it.” More specifically, the primary objective of
the NCAIC
is to make recommendations [to North Carolina] which reduce or
eliminate the possibility of the wrongful conviction of an innocent
person. Through its work, the [NCAIC] hopes to raise awareness of
the issues surrounding wrongful convictions[,] . . . increase the
conviction of the guilty, positively impact public trust and
confidence in [North Carolina’s] justice system, and decrease the
80
overall cost of the prosecution, trial and appeal processes.

76. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 n.16 (1986) (citations omitted).
77. E.g., Interview with Christine Mumma, Exec. Dir., N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n,
Duke Univ. School of Law, in Durham, N.C. (Feb. 15, 2006).
78. Staff of Carolina Journal Online, Friday Interview: Wrongful Convictions, CAROLINA J.
ONLINE, Oct. 28, 2005, http://www.carolinajournal.com/exclusives/display_exclusive.html?id=
2883 (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
79. Mumma, supra note 11, at 649.
80. Id. at 651.
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Representatives of each arm of the criminal justice system in North
81
Carolina sit on the NCAIC.
The NCAIC’s first study was on erroneous eyewitness
identification, which is recognized “as the leading factor in the
wrongful conviction of those exonerated nationally by DNA
82
evidence.” In October 2003, after months of research, the NCAIC
issued recommended procedures for law enforcement officials
conducting eyewitness identification in North Carolina.83
The NCAIC next studied the postconviction availability of
factual innocence claim review, with members agreeing “that neither
the appellate nor adversarial process is conducive to postconviction
review of claims of innocence.”84 Members of the NCAIC discussed
the structural and procedural considerations for factual innocence
85
claim review under North Carolina’s criminal justice system. They
drafted a proposal for the creation of an independent “innocence
commission” that would review factual innocence claims,86 looking to
the United Kingdom’s Criminal Cases Review Commission as a
87
prototype. In March 2005, the NCAIC voted nineteen to nine to
send the proposal to the North Carolina General Assembly.88

81. Id. The NCAIC is a group of approximately thirty members, including “the Chief
Justice . . . the State Attorney General . . . law enforcement, defense attorneys, [and] victim
advocates.” Id.
82. Id. at 652.
83. Id. at 653.
84. Id. at 654.
85. Id.
86. Associated Press, Innocence Commission Proposes Review Board, INJUSTICEBUSTERS,
Mar. 9, 2005, http://injusticebusters.com/05/North_Carolina.shtml (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
87. Mumma, supra note 11, at 654.
88. Associated Press, supra note 86.
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The bill stagnated in committee, but with a few modifications
eventually found strong bipartisan support and was approved by the
90
House and Senate in late July 2006. The most significant
compromise was between House and Senate members who disagreed
over whether the commission should allow defendants who admitted
guilt at trial to later claim innocence.91 On August 3, 2006, Governor
Easley signed the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission Act
into law, and North Carolina became the first state in the United
States to establish a standing innocence commission to review
92
possible wrongful convictions.
The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission (NCIIC)
93
Act created a new independent review commission “to investigate
and determine credible claims of factual innocence” in North
Carolina.94 It includes a sunset provision that disbands the NCIIC in
95
fours years unless the General Assembly renews the law. The NCIIC
consists of eight voting members appointed by the Chief Justice of the
North Carolina Supreme Court and the Chief Judge of the Court of
Appeals. Its members must include one superior court judge, one
prosecuting attorney, one victim advocate, one criminal defense

89. The proposal drafted by the NCAIC underwent five modifications in the General
Assembly before being passed: (1) In Section 15A-1463(a), with the addition of an acting sheriff
to the NCIIC, the number of voting members was increased from seven to eight; (2) In Section
15A-1463(a), instead of the Chief Justice appointing all of the voting members, appointing
authority was shifted, such that the Chief Justice appoints five members (including the two
discretionary appointments) and the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals appoints three
members; (3) In Section 15A-1467(b), a sentence was added stating that the waiver of
procedural safeguards and privileges does not apply to matters unrelated to the defendant’s
innocence claim; (4) In Section 15A-1468(c), the standard for cases where the defendant was
convicted on a plea of guilty was changed, such that a unanimous vote of the eight NCIIC
members is required for judicial review; and (5) a sunset provision was added that disbands the
NCIIC in four years unless legislators renew the law. Compare H.R. 1323, 147th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2005), with H.R. 1323, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006) (enacted).
90. H.R. 1323, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2006). The bill passed the House by a
vote of 86 to 28 and passed the Senate by a vote of 46 to 2. North Carolina General Assembly,
http://www.ncleg.net/gascripts/BillLookUp/BillLookUp.pl?Session=2005&BillID=H1323 (last
visited Feb. 24, 2007).
91. Andrea Weigl, Innocence Bill Passed by House, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.),
Jul. 26, 2006, at 5B. A conference committee devised the following compromise: The
commission will not allow claims from defendants convicted on a guilty plea in the first two
years of its operations. Id.; see infra notes 107–110 and accompanying text.
92. Weir, supra note 8.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1460 to 15A-1475 (Supp. 2006).
94. § 15A-1461.
95. 2006-3 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 79 (LexisNexis).
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96

attorney, one acting sheriff, one member of the public, and two other
members at the discretion of the Chief Justice.97
The NCIIC will only review claims of factual innocence—not
legal or procedural claims—and these will be heavily screened at the
discretion of the NCIIC’s staff to ensure that only credible claims
98
generate formal inquiries. Some NCAIC members believe that
current law school innocence projects, such as the Duke Law
Innocence Project, could assume initial screening responsibilities on
99
behalf of the NCIIC. The NCIIC requires that a defendant filing a
claim assert “complete innocence of any criminal responsibility for
the felony for which the [defendant] was convicted and for any other
100
reduced level of criminal responsibility relating to the crime.”
Moreover, the defendant has to provide “credible, verifiable evidence
of innocence that has not previously been presented at trial or
considered at a hearing granted through postconviction relief.”101
In addition, the Act seeks to minimize gratuitous claims of
factual innocence by requiring the defendant to sign an agreement,
before any formal inquiry is granted, in which the defendant
voluntarily “waives his or her procedural safeguards and privileges,
agrees to cooperate with the [NCIIC], and agrees to provide full
102
disclosure regarding all inquiry requirements of the [NCIIC].” If
any evidence of a crime is disclosed to the NCIIC during the
103
proceedings, it will refer that evidence to the prosecution unless it is
unrelated to the crime for which the defendant is claiming factual

96. The member of the public must be neither an attorney nor a judge. § 15A-1463(a).
97. Id.
98. § 15A-1466; Mumma, supra note 3.
99. Memorandum from the N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n, Structural and Operational
Discussion Points 3 (Oct. 15, 2004) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
100. § 15A-1460(1).
101. Id.
102. § 15A-1467(b).
103. See § 15A-1468(d) (“Evidence of criminal acts, professional misconduct, or other
wrongdoing disclosed through formal inquiry or Commission proceedings shall be referred to
the appropriate authority.”); Staff of Carolina Journal Online, supra note 78. Christine Mumma,
Executive Dir. of the North Carolina Actual Innocence Commission, stated, “Another way of
weeding [noncredible] cases out . . . is [that] there has to be consequences for inmates who claim
innocence when indeed they are not. So anything uncovered during an investigation . . . would
be turned over to the prosecution.” Id.
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104

innocence. It will also disclose to the defendant and his attorney any
favorable evidence that it discovers.105
In return for prisoners’ full cooperation, the NCIIC will
independently investigate prisoners’ claims. It is entitled to full
disclosure from the trial-level defense and prosecution teams and has
the authority to compel the attendance of witnesses and the
106
production of evidence. Once a formal inquiry is complete, the
relevant evidence is presented to the full NCIIC, which can conduct
107
open or closed hearings at its discretion. Except in cases where the
defendant pleaded guilty, if at least five of the eight voting members
believe that “there is sufficient evidence of factual innocence to merit
judicial review,” then the claim will be referred to a postcommission
three-judge panel appointed by the Chief Justice.108 For the first two
years of its existence, the NCIIC will not allow any claims from
109
defendants who pleaded guilty; after two years, such claims can only
be referred to the three-judge panel upon a unanimous vote from the
eight-member commission.110
The three-judge panel cannot include any trial judge with
“substantial previous involvement in the case.”111 After an evidentiary
hearing in which the state is represented by the district attorney or a
112
designee, and the defendant is represented by an attorney, the
three-judge panel decides “whether the [defendant] has proved by
clear and convincing evidence that the [defendant] is innocent of the
charges.”113 If the three-judge panel is unanimous, the panel dismisses
all charges against the defendant.114 Although decisions of the NCIIC
and the three-judge panel are not subject to further review,
defendants can file additional claims of factual innocence with the
NCIIC.115

104. See § 15A-1467(b) (“The waiver under this subsection does not apply to matters
unrelated to a [defendant’s] claim of innocence.”).
105. § 15A-1468(d).
106. § 15A-1467(d)–(f).
107. § 15A-1468(a).
108. § 15A-1468(c).
109. Weigl, supra note 91.
110. Id.
111. § 15A-1469(a).
112. § 15A-1469(c)–(e).
113. § 15A-1469(h).
114. Id.
115. See § 15A-1470(a) (“[D]ecisions of the Commission . . . are final and not
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III. THE UNITED KINGDOM’S
CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION
The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) is the
independent review commission in the United Kingdom that reviews
suspected miscarriages of criminal justice.116 Given that many of the
fundamental characteristics of the NCIIC were based upon those of
the CCRC, it is important to understand the CCRC’s origin and
structure.
The criminal justice systems in the United Kingdom and the
United States, although not identical, are quite similar with respect to
the characteristics relevant to a comparison between the NCIIC and
the CCRC.117 Both systems employ substantially the same basic
procedures to carry a case from arrest to conviction, and from
118
conviction through appeal. For example, in both countries law
enforcement officials investigate criminal offenses and a central
prosecutors’ office prosecutes the offense on behalf of the
government.119 In addition, the Crown Courts and the Criminal
Division of the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom are
analogous to state trial and appellate courts in the United States, and
the House of Lords is similar to the U.S. Supreme Court in that it
decides only appeals on points of law of general public importance.120
Thus, the CCRC can provide a useful model for the NCIIC in North
Carolina.
One difference between the two systems is that separation of
powers issues do not exist within the parliamentary system of the
United Kingdom, but are fundamental to North Carolina’s tripartite

subject to further review . . . .”); Robertson, supra note 34 (“There are no appeals to the judges’
ruling, but defendants could file additional requests for review with the commission.”).
116. 2004–2005 CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N ANN. REP. 10 (U.K.) [hereinafter 2004–
2005 CCRC ANN. REP.]; 1998–1999 CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N ANN. REP. 6 (U.K.)
[hereinafter 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP.].
117. Findley, supra note 14, at 100–05; Griffin, supra note 69, at 1243–46.
118. David Horan, The Innocence Commission: An Independent Review Board for Wrongful
Convictions, 20 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 91, 102 (2002) (“[T]he overall structure of the English courts
is very similar to that of the criminal courts in the United States.” (quoting J. DAVID HIRSCHEL
& WILLIAM WAKEFIELD, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 127
(1995))).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 103.
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121
government. A separation of powers issue is, however, unlikely to
arise over the NCIIC because, as with the CCRC, the judiciary makes
the actual decision on each defendant’s case. The nonbinding nature
of the recommendations made by the NCIIC and CCRC preserves
their independence and insulates them from political pressures.122
Another difference is that North Carolina allows postconviction
challenges through direct appeals and collateral remedies, such as the
MAR and federal habeas relief, whereas the United Kingdom
provides only limited opportunities for direct appeals and no
123
mechanism for collateral remedies. Unlike the NCIIC, the CCRC
provides a forum for postconviction challenges that otherwise does
not exist in the United Kingdom.124 However, as discussed in Part I,
the collateral remedies in North Carolina also provide little or no
redress for prisoners with factual innocence claims.125 Given the
procedural and judge-related limitations, such claims are rarely
litigated under the current system. Therefore, the NCIIC, like the
CCRC, does not simply add another layer of review, but instead
serves an essentially unique function.126
The CCRC was established in response to concerns similar to
those that undermined public confidence in the criminal justice
system throughout the United States. Before 1997, miscarriage of
justice claims in the United Kingdom were made to the home
secretary under Section 17 of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1968, and
were referred to the Court of Appeal at the secretary’s discretion.127
In practice, cases were referred only when new evidence emerged
after the trial; even then, the Court of Appeal took a narrow view of
these claims.128 The system of review by the home secretary “was . . .

121. See id. at 101 (contrasting the United Kingdom’s system with state governments
generally).
122. See Barry C. Scheck & Peter J. Neufeld, Toward the Formation of “Innocence
Commissions” in America, 86 JUDICATURE 98, 104 (2002) (asserting that an essential element of
innocence commissions is that their recommendations should not be binding).
123. Id. at 104–05.
124. Findley, supra note 14, at 345.
125. See supra notes 34–75 and accompanying text (discussing remedies under North
Carolina law for innocent prisoners with factual innocence claims).
126. See Griffin, supra note 69, at 1303 (responding to hypothetical objections to an
independent review commission).
127. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, INTRODUCING THE COMM’N (2002) (UK),
available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/about.htm.
128. Id.
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thought to be unacceptably slow, insufficiently independent, and to
129
deliver too many wrong decisions.”
High-profile cases of wrongfully convicted persons, such as those
concerning the West Midlands Serious Crime Squad and the
Birmingham Six, highlighted weaknesses in the United Kingdom’s
criminal justice system. In 1989, the West Midlands Serious Crime
Squad was disbanded amid allegations of wrongdoing, and an
independent police inquiry produced evidence that the squad
130
fabricated evidence, tortured suspects, and coerced confessions.
This evidence led to thirty convictions being quashed by the Court of
Appeal.131 In 1991, six men, known as the Birmingham Six, were
released from prison after serving sixteen years for crimes they did
not commit. The men were arrested in 1974 after bombs exploded in
two Birmingham pubs, killing twenty-one people and injuring more
132
than 160 in the bloodiest IRA attack to that date. They were
released after a government inquiry revealed irregularities in the
police investigation, including altered statements and imperfect
forensic tests.133
In response to such cases and growing public concern, the home
secretary announced the establishment of a Royal Commission on
134
Criminal Justice in 1991. The Royal Commission was established to
review “the effectiveness of the criminal justice system in securing the
135
conviction of the guilty and the acquittal of the innocent.” The
Royal Commission presented a report to Parliament in July 1993 that
recommended the creation of an independent body to screen and
investigate suspected miscarriages of justice and refer appropriate
cases to the Court of Appeal.136 This proposal received a mixed
reaction from commentators. Some believed it would add an

129. SELECT COMM. ON HOME AFFAIRS, THE WORK OF THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW
COMM’N, FIRST REPORT, 1998–99, H.C. 106, at 1, available at http://www.parliament.thestationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199899/cmselect/cmhaff/106/10602.htm.
130. Ian Burrell, West Midlands Serious Crime Squad, INDEP. (London), Nov. 1, 1999, at A8.
131. Id.
132. On This Day: 14 Mar. 1991: Birmingham Six Freed After Sixteen Years, BBC NEWS
ONLINE, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/14/newsid_2543000/2543613.stm
(last visited Feb. 24, 2006).
133. CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, supra note 127.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and obscure the role of the courts.
Others commended the proposal because it recognized the system’s
failure to seek out new evidence of innocence and proposed an
independent body that would be more insulated from political and
judicial pressures.138
The proposal gained widespread acceptance from members of
Parliament—across all political parties—as politicians generally
139
recognized the need for an independent review commission. The
Criminal Appeal Act of 1995, which established the Criminal Cases
Review Commission (CCRC), was subsequently passed, and the
CCRC began handling cases in March of 1997.140
The CCRC is an independent public body, accountable to the
home secretary, that reviews suspected miscarriages of criminal
justice.141 By statute, the CCRC may consist of no fewer than eleven
commissioners.142 Commissioners are appointed by the Queen on the
advice of the Prime Minister;143 at least one-third must be lawyers and
at least two-thirds must have expertise in the criminal justice
144
system.
The CCRC refers cases to the Court of Appeal where “there is a
real possibility that the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence would
145
not be upheld were the reference to be made.” A miscarriage of
justice claim must be based on “an argument, or evidence, not raised
146
Absent
in the proceedings . . . [or] exceptional circumstances.”

137. Horan, supra note 118, at 131–32 (citing A Just Commission: The Runciman Report is
Good in Most of its Parts, TIMES (London), July 7, 1993, at A17).
138. Id. at 133–34 (citing Gareth Williams, In the True Interests of Justice, TIMES (London),
July 7, 1993, at A16).
139. See, e.g., Righting the Past: It’s Society Versus the Courts, GUARDIAN (London), July 21,
1998, at 15 (noting that the creation of the CCRC “reflected a widespread unease—across
society and the political parties—at the growing number of miscarriages of justice”).
140. Id.
141. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 10; 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra
note 116, at 6.
142. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 8(3) (Eng.). In 2007, the eleven commissioners were
Professor Graham Zellick (Chair), Alastair R. MacGregor QC, Michael Allen, Penelope
Barrett, Mark Emerton, Jim England, Julie Goulding, David Jessel, Ian Nichol, Ewen Smith,
and
John
Weeden.
Criminal
Cases
Review
Comm’n,
Commissioners,
http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/about/about_29.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
143. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 8(4).
144. Id. § 8(5)–(6).
145. Id. § 13(1)(a).
146. Id. § 13(1)(b)(i), (2). Exceptional circumstances include cases in which evidence was
not discovered by the defense at the time of trial because of, for example, “legal incompetence,”
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“exceptional circumstances,” only cases that have exhausted their
147
appeals are eligible for referral. Though the Criminal Appeal Act
does not define the standard for “real possibility,” the Court of
Appeal describes the standard as “more than an outside chance or a
bare possibility but which may be less than a probability or a
likelihood or a racing certainty” that the conviction, verdict, finding
148
or sentence would be found “unsafe.”
149
Stage One of the CCRC review process is an eligibility
assessment. Once the CCRC receives an application from a person
making a miscarriage of justice claim, a commissioner determines
whether it is eligible for review.150 About one-third of the applications
151
are closed during Stage One. The vast majority of applications
determined to be ineligible are applications where the appeals
process has not been exhausted.152 An application is also ineligible for
review if it arises from a criminal conviction outside of England,
153
Wales, or Northern Ireland.
Stage Two of the review process is screening and intensive
review. Commissioners study the applications passed from Stage One
and preserve the documents held by public bodies that are relevant to
154
the applications. Cases requiring limited review are screened and
usually completed within ninety working days.155 Cases requiring more

“mistaken tactical decision,” or a “failure to appreciate its full significance.” Griffin, supra note
69, at 1276.
147. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 13(1)(c) (“A reference . . . shall not be
made . . . unless an appeal against the conviction, verdict, finding or sentence has been
determined or leave to appeal against it has been refused.”); 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra
note 116, at 22 (“If the appeals process has not been exhausted and . . . there are no exceptional
circumstances, the case is closed.”).
148. R v. CCRC, ex p. Pearson, (1999) 3 All E.R. 498 (Q.B.). “The Court of Appeal is the
highest court within the [U.K. court system], which also includes the High Court and Crown
Court.” Her Majesty’s Courts Service, Information About—Court of Appeal, http://
www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/1235.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2007).
149. The CCRC annual reports designate three different stages of the review process: Stage
One is an eligibility assessment; Stage Two is screening and intensive review; and Stage Three is
the appointment of an investigative officer. See generally 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra
note 116; 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116.
150. 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 8.
151. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 22.
152. 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 8.
153. Id.
154. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 22. By statute, the CCRC has the
power to obtain documents from public bodies. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 17 (Eng.).
155. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 22.
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intensive review are assigned to caseworkers and may be investigated
through the use of CCRC resources, the appointment of an outside
156
expert, or the formal appointment of an investigative officer.
Stage Three of the review process is the appointment of an
investigative officer. The CCRC will appoint an investigative officer if
the case is particularly complex or involves other alleged crimes.157
However, few cases proceed to Stage Three: between 1997 and 2005,
only thirty-seven cases required the appointment of an investigative
158
officer.
Case reviews result in either a decision by the CCRC to refer the
application to the Court of Appeal, or a decision that the CCRC is
159
“not minded to refer.” A decision of “not minded to refer” is made
by one commissioner with no previous involvement in the case.160 If a
referral seems likely after Stage Two or Stage Three, the application
is passed to a committee, and a caseworker presents an overview of
the case to the commissioners.161 A decision to refer a case can only be
made by a committee of at least three commissioners with no
162
previous involvement in the case.
Following a referral by the CCRC, the Court of Appeal makes a
decision on the case. The standard for granting relief based on new
evidence is far lower in the United Kingdom’s courts than in the
United States. The United Kingdom’s Court of Appeal must receive
new evidence if (1) the evidence is capable of belief, (2) the evidence
may afford any ground for an appeal, (3) the evidence relates to an
issue on appeal, and would have been admissible in the proceedings
giving rise to the appeal, and (4) there is a reasonable explanation for
163
the failure to adduce the evidence in those proceedings. Given the

156. Id.
157. Id. at 23; Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 19. The investigative officer has always
been a senior police officer. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 23.
158. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 23.
159. 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 9.
160. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 22–23. If a decision of “not minded to
refer” is made, the applicant is provided an opportunity to respond to CCRC’s provisional
statement of reasons. Id. The applicant’s response is considered before a final decision is made.
Id. at 23. In practice, the primary reasons given for non-referral decisions have been “the court’s
sense that the defendant was merely seeking a chance to put in a new defense after the first one
had failed or because new evidence was insufficiently compelling to render the conviction
unsafe.” Griffin, supra note 69, at 1280.
161. 1998–1999 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 9.
162. Id.; 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 23.
163. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 4 (Eng.).
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new evidence, the Court of Appeal must “allow an appeal against
164
conviction if they think that the conviction is unsafe.” A survey by
one commentator revealed that the Court of Appeal is quite liberal in
reversing convictions based on new evidence, investigative
misconduct, eyewitness misidentification, and scientific evidence.165
The CCRC received “unanimously benign press” in its first year
of operation, but commentators began to criticize it more frequently
as CCRC decisions came under judicial review and its caseload
166
increased. Some called the review process “too meticulous” and
said “the CCRC . . . appears to be performing supererogatory
functions.”167 In 2004–2005 forty-one applicants mounted challenges
by judicial review against the CCRC, a fivefold increase from the
168
prior fiscal year. Some of these challenges related to, for example,
delays in processing a claim and decisions not to pursue particular
169
investigative steps. However, media coverage of the CCRC—both
positive and negative—has faded in recent years.170
The CCRC received a total of 7,602 applications between 1997
171
and 2005, including 955 applications in 2004–2005. As of March 31,
2005, the CCRC had referred 271 (4.4 percent) of 6,842 cases it
172
reviewed to appeals courts. As these statistics indicate, a significant
backlog developed in the CCRC’s initial years.173 An unexpectedly
high volume of cases combined with a lack of resources overwhelmed
the CCRC in its first few years and caused delays in processing new

164. Id. § 2(1).
165. Griffin, supra note 69, at 1282–87.
166. Bob Woffinden, Justice Delayed, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 6, 1998, at 17.
167. Id.
168. See 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 27 (“In 2004–05 there were 41 such
challenges compared to eight in 2003–04.”).
169. Id. The CCRC has established formal policy and procedures for judicial review that
allow applicants to “challenge breach[es] . . . of the public law principles of lawfulness, fairness
and reasonableness.” CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMM’N, JUDICIAL REVIEW BY APPLICANTS,
DOCUMENT NO. 621938, 1, available at http://www.ccrc.gov.uk/documents/JUDICIAL_REVI
EW_BY_APPLICANTS.pdf.
170. Cf. David Jessel, Turning a Blind Eye, GUARDIAN (London), July 13, 2004, at 16.
Commissioner David Jessel has suggested that the CCRC has caused a precipitous decline in
investigative journalism because miscarriage of justice claims have become the CCRC’s domain.
Id.
171. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 24. The CCRC has also received 540
reapplications, of which 21 have been referred to appeals courts. Id. at 27.
172. Id. at 26.
173. Id. at 25–26.
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174
applications. In 1998, the CCRC estimated that new applicants
would “have to wait up to two years before their cases can be
[reviewed] and it may be more than 30 years before the backlog is
175
cleared.” Additionally, limitations on the budget have led to fewer
cases being completed and rising waitlists.176
Despite this backlog, CCRC has achieved relative success in
referring cases with a “real possibility” of reversal to the appeals
177
courts and ultimately correcting miscarriages of justice. Between
1997 and 2005, the appeals courts decided on 229 referrals, quashing
178
135 convictions and upholding 63 convictions. Moreover, the CCRC
has made great strides in restoring public confidence in the justice
system by providing a receptive government forum for miscarriage of
justice claims.179 Although there are certainly some areas for
improvement, the CCRC has been called “incomparably better” than
180
the previous system of review.

IV. COMPARISON OF THE NORTH CAROLINA INNOCENCE INQUIRY
COMMISSION AND THE CRIMINAL CASES REVIEW COMMISSION
Both the NCIIC and CCRC operate as independent bodies,
removed from the judiciary and executive, that conduct impartial
181
investigations into factual innocence or miscarriage of justice claims.
Their independence limits political pressures that invariably surround
investigations into suspected mistakes by other government bodies.
The representative diversity on the commissions, mandated by
statute, allows for varied perspectives in the decisionmaking

174. Horan, supra note 118, at 162–63.
175. Id. (quoting Alan Travis, Justice Body’s Case Plea Rebuffed by Straw, GUARDIAN
(London), Dec. 16, 1998, at 12.)
176. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 6. Budget constraints led to a
moratorium on CCRC hiring in 2004–2005; as a result, CCRC could not increase the number of
case review managers to a level necessary to clear the backlog. Id.
177. See Grania Langdon-Down, Justice Will Be Done, INDEP. (London), Mar. 30, 1998, at
23 (suggesting that defense lawyers who had previously been critical of the CCRC have
generally been pleased with its operations). Chairman Zellick has described the CCRC as a
“conspicuous success.” Joshua Rozenberg, Justice Watchdog Widens Appeal, DAILY
TELEGRAPH (London), Dec. 4, 2003, at 22.
178. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 26.
179. See Horan, supra note 118, at 155–56. Investigative journalists, for example, who had
long provided a vehicle for uncovering miscarriage of justice claims, learned that the
government was now willing to listen and cooperate with them. Id. at 155.
180. Langdon-Down, supra note 177.
181. See supra notes 92–97, 141–144 and accompanying text.
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182
process. Moreover, as standing commissions, both the NCIIC and
CCRC can routinely review all types of claims, not just high-profile
claims, and uncover mistakes that would have otherwise been
183
ignored.
The NCIIC and CCRC both preserve judicial economy by
screening out meritless wrongful conviction claims and identifying for
the courts the claims most deserving of further review. The CCRC’s
referral statistics indicate that it employs a heavy screening
mechanism: only 4.4 percent of the completed cases were referred to
184
appeals courts. A similar procedure is envisioned for the NCIIC,
where “claims would be heavily screened, to ensure that only credible
claims are considered” before the formal voting members of the
NCIIC.185 Once there, the NCIIC must find sufficient evidence of
factual innocence to refer the claim to the court system.186 The NCIIC
also hopes to screen gratuitous claims through a waiver of safeguards
187
and privileges, discussed below.
Both the NCIIC and CCRC require that a defendant’s claim be
188
based on newly discovered evidence. Thus, any objections that the
NCIIC or the courts would be second-guessing juries are unfounded,
because the NCIIC would not consider claims where the evidence was
previously presented before a jury.189
The NCIIC conducts public hearings at its own discretion; there
190
is no statutory mandate to open its proceedings to the public.
Similarly, the CCRC’s proceedings are generally closed to the public,
as there is a general prohibition on the disclosure of any information
to non-applicants.191 Peg Dorer, a member of the North Carolina
Conference of District Attorneys, has argued that all the NCIIC’s

182. See supra notes 96–97, 144 and accompanying text.
183. See Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 122, at 103–05 (identifying the essential elements of
an innocence commission and proposing a model for investigating wrongful convictions based
on the National Transportation Safety Board and Canadian Innocence Inquiry models).
184. 2004–2005 CCRC ANN. REP., supra note 116, at 26.
185. Mumma, supra note 3.
186. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1468(c) (2006).
187. See infra notes 196–198 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 101, 146 and accompanying text.
189. See § 15A-1460(1) (The defendant must provide “credible, verifiable evidence of
innocence that has not previously been presented at trial or considered at a hearing granted
through postconviction relief.”).
190. Id. § 15A-1468(a).
191. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, §§ 23–25 (Eng.).

04__MAIATICO.DOC

1370

6/7/2007 4:14 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1345

proceedings should be open to the public, just like most other
proceedings in the criminal justice system. Prosecutors were already
uncomfortable with the loss of control over these cases; closed
192
meetings further compound the issue. However, closed proceedings
allow the NCIIC “to exercise sensible control over the length and
breadth of their proceedings” and prevent proceedings from turning
193
into television dramas or political forums.
Like the CCRC,
transparency can be achieved by the NCIIC through annual reports,
website information, and budgetary disclosures.194 In addition, the
NCIIC’s evidence disclosure requirements provide another layer of
195
transparency.
One of the major distinctions between the CCRC and the NCIIC
is the NCIIC’s requirement that defendants waive their procedural
safeguards and agree to provide full disclosure before a formal
196
inquiry into their factual innocence claim begins. In addition, if the
NCIIC uncovers evidence of a crime, the NCIIC must disclose that
evidence to the prosecution unless the evidence is unrelated to the
defendant’s claim. The General Assembly wisely closed the loophole
left by the NCAIC, which would have subjected defendants to
prosecution for crimes—unrelated to their innocence claim—revealed
during the investigation of their claim.197 Such broad waiver and
disclosure requirements could have screened out credible claims of
factual innocence, because defendants would have feared exposure to
unrelated charges.
Defendants probably remain wary that evidence obtained by the
NCIIC may be used against them in other postconviction
proceedings. Nevertheless, pursuing such “an extraordinary
procedure to investigate credible claims should require an

192. N.C. Actual Innocence Comm’n, Minutes of the Meeting 2 (Feb. 18, 2005) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
193. See Scheck & Neufeld, supra note 122, at 105 (describing the balance that must be
struck between transparency and control).
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 103–105 and accompanying text. Evidence of criminal acts is disclosed
to the prosecution, whereas favorable evidence is disclosed to the defendant and his attorney.
Id.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(b) (2006).
197. Robertson, supra note 34. State Senator R.C. Soles, D-Columbus, believed the waiver
and disclosure requirements in the original bill were too severe, and he likely played a
significant role in closing the loophole. Id. Soles had said, “If you’re sitting over there on death
row and you know you’re not guilty and you can prove it, I don’t see why you need to waive
your constitutional rights and admit you stole your grandmother’s purse.” Id.
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extraordinary commitment by the defendant” to waive their rights
198
As a truth-seeking
and cooperate fully with all inquiries.
commission, the NCIIC depends on the full cooperation of all
claimants for the system to work. This extraordinary commitment
should act as a strong screening mechanism against frivolous claims
and allow the NCIIC to avoid the backlog that plagues the CCRC.
While the CCRC allows miscarriage of justice claims regardless
of the plea entered in the trial court, the compromise reached in the
North Carolina General Assembly prevents defendants who pleaded
guilty from seeking relief through the NCIIC in its first two years of
existence;199 after that, those defendants must meet a higher standard
200
than any other claimants. Even so, state prosecutors are not pleased
with the compromise; some have suggested that it is “‘making a
mockery of the system.’”201 Critics maintain that allowing those who
declared their guilt to now maintain their innocence is an affront to
202
the integrity of the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, defendants
convicted on a guilty plea may still have credible innocence claims.
Some defendants plead guilty because it is a plea bargain: they may
be innocent, but do not want to risk a longer sentence at trial. Others
may not have understood what they agreed to, or may have received
bad advice from their counsel. According to the Innocence Project, 4
percent of the people exonerated by DNA evidence between 1989
and 2006 had pleaded guilty at trial.203 To provide full protection for
such defendants, the legislature should consider relaxing the higher
burden that applies to innocence claims brought by prisoners who
initially pleaded guilty, and treating all claimants equally.
Unlike the CCRC, the NCIIC does not require by statute that
defendants exhaust all appeals to be eligible for factual innocence

198. N.C. ACTUAL INNOCENCE COMM’N, BILL INTRODUCTION SUMMARY: INNOCENCE
INQUIRY COMMISSION 2 (2005).
199. Weigl, supra note 91.
200. See § 15A-1468(c) (requiring all eight members of the commission to vote for judicial
review for defendants who pleaded guilty versus only five votes needed for review for other
defendants).
201. Mike Baker, N.C. Lawmakers OK Innocence Commission, BOSTON.COM, July 26, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2006/07/26/nc_lawmakers_ok_innocence_com
mission (last visited Feb. 24, 2007) (quoting Garry Frank, president of the district attorneys’
coalition).
202. Andrea Weigl, N.C. Innocence Panel Awaits Easley’s Blessing, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 27, 2006, at 10A.
203. Id.
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204
review. Thus, defendants are allowed to make simultaneous claims
through the NCIIC and court system. To limit the number of claims
filed with the NCIIC, many prosecutors wanted the NCIIC to review
205
only claims where all appeals had been exhausted. Others argue
that an exhaustion requirement would “ensure that defendants will
not simply bypass appellate court remedies to try their claims with a
206
possibly more sympathetic, quasi-judicial body.” However, this
argument suggests that defendants with credible claims of innocence
do not deserve timely review from an independent commission and
must first petition appellate courts that are not designed to hear
factual claims. This argument also overlooks the cases where the
NCIIC would provide relief before the defendant exhausts all of his
appeals. If the defendant has a credible claim of innocence, the
NCIIC is likely to provide more immediate relief, obviating the
defendant’s need to clutter the court system with additional claims.
Thus, the NCIIC improves judicial economy because it acts as a
screening mechanism for the courts.
In the United Kingdom, the standard for reversal of a conviction
207
is whether the appeals court finds the conviction to be “unsafe.”
This standard places the burden of defending the conviction on the
prosecution. Under the NCIIC, the standard for reversal is whether
the three-judge panel finds “clear and convincing evidence” of the
defendant’s innocence.208 This standard places the burden of proving
209
innocence on the defendant. The more-restrictive NCIIC standard
balances the fundamental correctness of the conviction against the
state’s interest in the finality of its criminal justice proceedings, giving
more weight to the finality interest than the United Kingdom’s
standard does.210 Because of the passage of time associated with
collateral remedies like the NCIIC, proceedings will likely be plagued

204. See supra note 147.
205. Cf. Andrea Weigl, Innocence Principals Seek Accord, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), May 21, 2005, at 5B (listing the changes to the NCIIC sought by prosecutors and defense
attorneys).
206. Horan, supra note 118, at 171.
207. See supra notes 145–48, and accompanying text.
208. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1469(h) (2006).
209. Id.
210. Cf. supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text (discussing how the United States
Supreme Court is similarly concerned with balancing the fundamental correctness of a
conviction against the state’s interest in the finality of proceedings in the context of federal
habeas relief).
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211
by the “erosion of memory” and “dispersion of witnesses.” Thus,
the more-restrictive standard is acceptable because it protects the
public from guilty defendants being released.212
While the CCRC only has the authority to compel the
production of documents from public bodies,213 the NCIIC has full
statutory authority to compel document production, just as the courts
214
do. This represents an improvement upon the CCRC model, and
the CCRC has begun to lobby for more complete authority over
private bodies based on the investigative limitations it has
experienced.215
While both the NCIIC and CCRC allow unlimited reapplications
by defendants, only the NCIIC forecloses the right to judicial review
of its decisions. In the United Kingdom, the benefits to judicial
economy that the CCRC offers are threatened by the possibility that
216
its decisions not to refer cases will be reviewed judicially. The
NCIIC avoids this issue because “the decisions of the [NCIIC] and of
the three-judge panel are final and not subject to further review by
appeal, certification, writ, motion, or otherwise.”217
Finally, although the United Kingdom’s commission is entitled
the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the North Carolina
commission has a more narrow title: the North Carolina Innocence
Inquiry Commission. The “innocence” moniker appears to limit the
scope of the NCIIC and forms an implicit judgment about its mission:
that the NCIIC is merely a “criminal defense movement when it
218
really is much more.” The NCIIC is concerned not only with
protecting the innocent, but also with seeking justice. An effective
and efficient criminal justice system is achieved by “both acquitting

211. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453 (1986) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107,
127–28 (1982)).
212. See id.
213. Criminal Appeal Act, 1995, c. 35, § 17 (Eng.).
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1467(d)–(f) (2006).
215. Horan, supra note 118, at 159.
216. See id. at 168 (asserting that making decisions of the commission not judicially
reviewable was a “more sensible design”).
217. § 15A-1470(a). This Note centers on comparisons between the NCIIC and CCRC, and
it does not seek to address whether some defendants who have been denied review by the
NCIIC could have valid due process or other constitutional claims, despite the statutory
language foreclosing judicial review.
218. See Findley, supra note 14, at 353 (championing “Criminal Justice Study Commission”
as a more appropriate title for proposed commissions instead of “Innocence Commissions”).
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219
the innocent and convicting the guilty,” and the NCIIC helps North
Carolina achieve both of these goals. Thus, the legislature should
have followed the United Kingdom’s model and adopted a more
inclusive title; for example, it could have named the commission, the
“North Carolina Criminal Cases Review Commission.”
The single greatest impediment to the success of the CCRC is a
220
lack of funding and resources. Budget issues also plague the NCIIC
at this early juncture. Supporters of the NCIIC had hoped for a
budget of close to $500,000, but the legislature appropriated only
$210,000.221 The NCIIC hopes to close that gap by relying on the pro
bono work of law students who would screen claims through their law
school’s Innocence Project. An overreliance on volunteers may,
unfortunately, lead to significant backlogs when these schools are not
in session.
The CCRC has achieved relative success in correcting
miscarriages of justice.222 From a comparative perspective, the NCIIC
should be able to match that success if it can avoid the budget and
resource pitfalls, and operate in a manner that improves judicial
economy. The average British citizen knows very little about the
CCRC, but publicity from high-profile exonerations has helped to
increase public confidence in the system. It may be difficult for the
NCIIC to fly under the radar—instead it is likely that it will be subject
to intense media scrutiny—but “conspicuous success”223 in its first few
years may help it overcome some early obstacles and high-profile
reversals would certainly aid the cause. Just as the appellate process
in the United Kingdom was not designed to handle miscarriages of
justice, the avenues for postconviction relief in the United States were
not adequately equipped to address claims of factual innocence. The
NCIIC fills that gap and provides a model for other states and the
federal government.

219. Id.
220. See supra notes 171–176 and accompanying text.
221. Phoebe Zerwick, New Panel Hopes, Hurdles; Three-Step Process Creates Another
Chance at Freedom for the Wrongly Convicted; Innocence Commission First in Nation to
Backstop Courts, WINSTON-SALEM J., Aug. 20, 2006. at A1.
222. See supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text.
223. Rozenberg, supra note 177.
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CONCLUSION
The cases of Darryl Hunt, Alan Gell, Ronald Cotton, and others
have eroded public confidence in North Carolina’s criminal justice
system and demonstrated the need for change. Innocent people were
wrongfully convicted, and before the NCIIC there was no effective
mechanism to correct these mistakes because under other methods of
postconviction review “the opportunity for bringing new evidence is
extremely limited; the standard of review is intolerably high; and
clemency is so rarely granted as to be virtually meaningless.”224
Consequently, innocent prisoners in North Carolina had limited
access to a forum for presenting their factual innocence claims. The
NCIIC ameliorates that problem by providing an effective forum for
those prisoners where new evidence strongly supports their factual
innocence claims. By establishing this commission, North Carolina
has expressed the importance it places on its criminal justice system
and on its citizens: “When someone’s freedom—or his very life—is at
stake, the state should rush, not hesitate, to make sure it recognizes
and corrects its errors.”225
Criminal justice experts have identified multiple factors that
contribute to wrongful convictions in North Carolina and across the
United States, including false eyewitness identifications, coerced
confessions, inaccurate lab reports, prosecutorial misconduct, and
226
poor legal representation. Innocence commissions like the NCIIC
and the CCRC do not directly address these systemic issues because
they are designed to provide a safety net for individual miscarriages
of justice.227 However, innocence commissions can help identify
patterns in these types of cases and draw much-needed scholarly
attention to the fallibilities of the criminal justice system.228 The
NCIIC represents progress because its statutory reporting
requirement will offer invaluable information on wrongful
convictions, and that information could become the basis for systemic

224. Griffin, supra note 69, at 1307.
225. Editorial, New Innocence Panel Reflects Well on N.C., PILOT (Southern Pines, N.C.),
Aug. 11, 2006, available at http://www.thepilot.com/stories/20060808/opinion/opinion/20060808
PilotEditorial.html.
226. Mumma, supra note 3.
227. See Findley, supra note 14, at 347–48 (“A commission like the CCRC more directly
seeks to identify and remedy individual injustices than recommend systemic reforms.”).
228. Id.
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229
reform. The NCIIC’s reports and recommendations, along with
high-profile findings of innocence, could help promote a climate of
reform within the North Carolina criminal justice system. Indeed, the
NCIIC’s pioneering approach to postconviction review of innocence
claims could also serve as a model for positive reform throughout the
United States.

229. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1475 (2006) (requiring that the NCIIC report on its
activities to various legislative committees and the State Judicial Council); § 7A-409.1
(mandating that the State Judicial Council produce statistical reports regarding inquiries and
any recommended changes for the General Assembly).

